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Abstract
We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to
characterize Bayesís rule as a classical example and Je§reyís rule as a non-classical
one. In Je§reyís rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that
some event has occurred, as in Bayesís rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to
some events. Despite their di§erences, Bayesís and Je§reyís rules can be character-
ized in terms of the same axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs
incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on
which the learnt input is ësilentí do not change. To illustrate the use of non-Bayesian
belief revision in economic theory, we sketch a simple decision-theoretic application.
Keywords: Belief revision, subjective probability, Bayesís rule, Je§reyís rule, axio-
matic foundations, Öne-grained versus coarse-grained beliefs, unawareness
1 Introduction
A belief-revision rule captures how an agentís subjective probabilities should change
when the agent learns something new. The standard example is Bayesís rule. Here,
the agent learns that some event has occurred, and the response is to raise the sub-
jective probability of that event to 1, while retaining all probabilities conditional on
it. Formally, let " be the underlying set of possible worlds (where " is non-empty
and, for simplicity, Önite or countably inÖnite).2 Subsets of " are called events. Be-
liefs are represented by some probability measure on the set of all events. Bayesís
rule says that, upon learning that some event B ! " has occurred (with p(B) 6= 0),
one should move from the prior probability measure p to the posterior probability
measure p0 given by
p0(A) = p(AjB) for all events A ! ".
1F. Dietrich, Paris School of Economics (CNRS); C. List, LSE; R. Bradley, LSE. We have presented
this paper at several seminars and conferences, and we thank the audiences for helpful comments.
These occasions include: D-TEA 2010 (HEC & Polytechnique, Paris, June 2010), LSEís Choice Group
Seminar (LSE, September 2010), Pluralism in the Foundations of Statistics (University of Kent,
September 2010), and Decisions, Games, and Logic 2012 (University of Munich, June 2012). Although
this paper is jointly authored, List and Bradley wish to note that the bulk of the mathematical
credit should go to Dietrich. Dietrich was supported by a Ludwig Lachmann Fellowship at the LSE
and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-12-INEG-0006-01). List was supported
by a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship and the Franco-Swedish Program in Philosophy and
Economics. Bradley was supported by an AHRC grant on ëManaging Severe Uncertaintyí.
2Everything we say could be generalized to an arbitrary measurable set !.
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In economic theory, belief changes are almost always modelled in this way. The
aim of this paper is to draw attention to a more general form of belief revision, which
is seldom discussed in economics. We develop a general framework in which di§erent
belief-revision rules ñ Bayesian and non-Bayesian ñ can be characterized. In it, the
key di§erence between di§erent belief-revision rules lies in what they assume about
the nature of the input prompting the agentís belief change. Under Bayesís rule, the
learnt input is always the occurrence of some event, but this is more restrictive than
often recognized, and we show that there is scope for useful generalization.
We begin with a story that will resonate with any international traveller. When
Kotaro Suzumura was applying for a lectureship at the LSE in the 1970s, shortly after
arriving in the UK from Japan, he was telephoned by Terence Gorman to inform him
of the outcome. Suzumura got a vague impression that he was being o§ered the job,
but struggled to understand Gormanís thick Irish accent. At the end of the call, he
was still unsure whether he had received an o§er ñ so unsure that it took a second
call to convince him, this time with Amartya Sen, who was able to conÖrm the news.
This story illustrates an instance of belief revision triggered by a noisy signal.
Before the telephone conversation with Gorman, Suzumura presumably attached a
fairly low probability to the event of him being appointed to the lectureship. After
the conversation, he attached a somewhat higher probability to it, but one that still
fell short of certainty. For this, a second conversation (with Sen) was needed. Such
cases present challenges to the Bayesian modeller. If the Örst change in Suzumuraís
probabilities is to be modelled as an application of Bayesís rule, then it will clearly
not su¢ce to restrict attention to the ënaÔveí set of possible worlds " = fappointed,
not appointedg. Relative to that ënaÔveí set, a Bayesian belief change could never
increase the probability of the event ëappointedí without raising it all the way to 1.
The modeller will need to enrich the set " to capture the possible sensory experi-
ences responsible for Suzumuraís shift in probabilities over the events ëappointedí and
ënot appointedí. So, the enriched set of worlds will have to be something like
"0 = fappointed, not appointedg & A;
where A is the set of possible analogue auditory signals received by Suzumuraís
eardrums. The signal he received from Gorman will then correspond to some subset
of "0, speciÖcally one of the form B = fappointed, not appointedg&A, where A ! A
is a particular ëauditory eventí. Not much less than this representation will do.
Even replacing A with a smaller set of possible verbal messages would not su¢ce,
since Gormanís words were subject to a triple distortion: by his thick accent, by
imperfections of the telephone line, and by the interpretation of a non-native speaker.
Enriching the set " in this way, however, has deÖnite modelling costs. First, the
agent (Suzumura) almost certainly did not have prior subjective probabilities over
the events from such a rich set. In light of the huge range of possible signals, the set
"0 is of dizzying size and complexity, when compared to the ënaÔveí set " on which
the agentís attention was originally focused. Second, it is doubtful that before the
conversation he was even aware of the possibility of such complex auditory signals
(probably he had never heard, or even imagined, an accent like Gormanís). So, a
Bayesian model of Suzumuraís story, and others like it, must inevitably involve a
heavy dose of Öction. It ascribes to the agent greater prior opinionation (ability to
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assign prior probabilities) and greater awareness (conceptualization or consideration
of events) than psychologically plausible. In a similar vein, Diaconis and Zabell (1982,
p. 823) have called the assignment of prior subjective probabilities to ëmany classes
of sensory experiences [...] forced, unrealistic, or impossibleí (see also Je§rey 1957
and Shafer 1981). Of course, whether this is a problem or not will depend on the
uses to which the model is put; we are not denying the usefulness of ëas-ifí modelling
in all cases. But good scientiÖc practice should encourage us to investigate whether
other belief-revision rules are better at capturing cases like the present one and how
these other rules relate to Bayesís rule. This is what motivates this paper.
One of the most prominent generalizations of Bayesís rule is Je§reyís rule (e.g.,
Je§rey 1957, Shafer 1981, Diaconis and Zabell 1982, Gr¸nwald and Halpern 2003).
Here, the agent learns a new probability of some event, for instance a 20% probab-
ility of an accident or a 75% probability of the o§er of a lectureship, as perhaps in
Suzumuraís case. More generally, the agent learns a new probability distribution of
some random variable such as the level of rainfall or GDP. The response, then, is to
assign the new distribution to that random variable, while retaining all probabilities
conditional on it. Formally, let B be a partition of the set " into Önitely many non-
empty events, and suppose the agent learns a new probability %B for each event B
in B. The family of learnt probabilities, (%B)B2B, is a probability distribution over
B (i.e., consists of non-negative numbers with sum-total 1). Je§reyís rule says that,
upon learning (%B)B2B, one should move from the prior probability measure p to the
posterior probability measure p0 given by
p0(A) =
X
B2B
p(AjB)%B for all events A ! ":3
For instance, suppose the agent learns that it will rain with probability 12 , snow
with probability 13 , and remain dry with probability
1
6 . Then the partition B (of a
suitable set ") contains the events of rain (R), snow (S), and no precipitation (N),
where %R = 12 , %S =
1
3 , and %N =
1
6 . Bayesís rule is the special case where B
partitions " into an event B and its complement B, with %B = 1 and %B = 0. (The
complement of any event B is B = "nB.)
The framework we develop allows us to deÖne and characterize di§erent belief-
revision rules. What is being learnt by the agent can take a variety of forms; we
call this the learnt input. It can be interpreted as the constraint that a particular
experience ñ say the receipt of some signal ñ imposes on the agentís beliefs. Examples
of learnt inputs are event occurrences for Bayesís rule and learnt probability distri-
butions for Je§reyís. But, in principle, the learnt inputs could also be very di§erent,
such as new conditional probabilities of certain events. We show that, despite their
di§erences, Bayesís and Je§reyís rules can be characterized in terms of the same two
axioms, simply applied to di§erent domains of learnt inputs.
Our axioms are (i) a responsiveness axiom, which requires that revised beliefs be
consistent with the learnt input, and (ii) a conservativeness axiom, which requires
that those beliefs on which the input is ësilentí (in a sense to be made precise) do
3For p0 to be well-deÖned, we must have "B = 0 whenever p(B) = 0. This ensures that if a term
p(AjB) is undeÖned in the displayed formula (because p(B) = 0), then this term does not matter
(because it is multiplied by "B = 0).
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not change. The fact that one of most prominent non-classical belief-revision rules,
namely Je§reyís rule, can be justiÖed in complete analogy to Bayesís rule should as-
suage some economistsí worry that non-Bayesian rules automatically involve costly
departures from compelling principles of belief revision. Our characterization can be
extended to other non-classical belief-revision rules too, but for expositional simpli-
city, we set these aside in this paper.4
We hope that our framework will inspire further work on economic applications,
and behaviourial implications, of non-Bayesian forms of belief revision. To sug-
gest some steps in this direction, we conclude the paper with a discussion of how
Je§rey revision may be introduced into decision and game theory, especially to cap-
ture ëunforeseen learningí; we also brieáy revisit the issue of unawareness.5
Prior literature. Bayesís and Je§reyís rules have been axiomatically characterized
in previous work, but the approach has been less uniÖed than ours. One approach is
a ëdistance-basedí one. This consists in showing that a given revision rule generates
posterior beliefs that incorporate the information learnt, while deviating as little as
possible from prior beliefs, relative to some notion of ëdistanceí between beliefs.6
Bayesís and Je§reyís rules have been characterized relative to either the variation
distance (deÖned by the maximal absolute di§erence in probability, over all events
in the algebra), the Hellinger distance, or the relative-entropy distance (e.g., Csiszar
1967, 1977, van Fraassen 1981, Diaconis and Zabell 1982, Gr¸nwald and Halpern
2003). The third notion of distance does not deÖne a proper metric, as it is asymmetric
in its two arguments. These results, however, do not generally carry over to other
belief-revision rules without changing the distance metric,7 and the interpretation of
di§erent distance metrics is often controversial.
Other characterization results invoke the idea of ërigidityí rather than distance-
minimization (e.g., Je§rey 1957 and Bradley 2005 for some extensions). For example,
Bayesian belief revision is ërigidí in the sense of preserving the conditional probability
of any event, given the learnt event. Although this approach is closer in spirit to ours,
it also lacks uniÖcation. Still, one might interpret our present conservativeness axiom
as a uniÖed alternative to earlier rigidity axioms, applicable to any belief-revision rule.
For an overview of various forms of probabilistic belief and belief revision, we refer
the reader to Halpernís handbook (2003). Since we here deal exclusively with beliefs
that are represented by subjective probability measures, we set aside the literature
on the revision of beliefs that do not take this form.
4One such rule is Adamsís rule, inspired by Ernst Adamsís work on the logic of conditionals
(Adams 1975) and formally introduced by Bradley (2005). It takes the learnt input to be a new
assignment of conditional probabilities of some events, given some other events. Another rule is the
ëdual-Je§reyí rule, which stands out for its natural ëdualityí to Je§reyís rule. Here, the learnt input
is a new conditional probability distribution, given a certain partition. We show in follow-up work
that these two rules uniquely satisfy our axioms on their respective domains.
5For a brief discussion of dynamic-consistency arguments for Je§reyís rule, similar to classic
dynamic-consistency arguments for Bayesís rule, see Vineberg (2011).
6Distance is represented by a function d : P#P ! R, where P is the set of all probability measures
over the events from ! and d(p; p0) is interpreted as the distance between two such measures, p; p0 2 P.
7For example, Douven and Romeijn (2011) characterize Adamsís rule by invoking a di§erent
measure of distance, the inverse relative-entropy distance, which di§ers from ordinary relative-entropy
distance in the inverted order of its arguments.
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2 A general framework
We can study belief revision in general by specifying
(i) a set P of possible belief states in which a given agent can be, and
(ii) a set I of possible inputs which can ináuence the agentís belief state.
A revision rule maps pairs (p; I) of an initial belief state p in P and an input I in I
to a new belief state p0 = pI in P. The pair (p; I) belongs to some domain D ! P &I
containing those beliefñinput pairs that are admissible under the given revision rule.
A revision rule is thus a function from D to P (see also Dietrich 2012).
Since we focus on beliefs that take the form of subjective probability measures, the
set P of possible belief states is the set of all probability measures over the events from
". Formally, a probability measure is a countably additive function p : 2% ! [0; 1]
with p(") = 1 (where " is the underlying Önite or countably inÖnite set of worlds).
How can we deÖne the set I of possible inputs? Looking at Bayesís rule alone, one
might be tempted to deÖne them as observed events B ! ". But Je§reyís rule and
the other rules introduced below permit di§erent inputs, such as a family (%B)B2B
of learnt probabilities in Je§reyís case.
Methodologically, one should not tie the notion of a ëlearnt inputí too closely to
one particular revision rule, by deÖning it as a mathematical object that is tailor-made
for that rule. This would exclude other revision rules from the outset and thereby
prevent us from giving a fully compelling axiomatic characterization of the rule in
question. Instead, we need an abstract notion of a ëlearnt inputí.
We deÖne a learnt input as a set of belief states I ! P, interpreted as the set
of those belief states that are consistent with the input. We can think of the input
I as the constraint that a particular experience, such as the receipt of some signal,
imposes on the agentís belief state. The set of logically possible inputs is I = 2P .
Note that this is deliberately general. An agentís belief change from p to pI upon
learning I 2 I is responsive to the input if pI 2 I. We can now deÖne the inputs
involved in Bayesian revision and Je§rey revision.
DeÖnition 1 A learnt input I 2 I is
/ Bayesian if I = fp0 : p0(B) = 1g for some event B 6= ?; we then write I = IB;8
/ Je§rey if I = fp0 : p0(B) = %B for all B 2 Bg for some probability distribution
(%B)B2B on some partition B; we then write I = I(&B)B2B .9
Here, and in what follows, we use the term partition to refer to a partition of " into
Önitely many non-empty events.
Clearly, every Bayesian input is also a Je§rey input, while the converse is not true.
Our framework also allows us to represent many other kinds of inputs, for instance
I = fp0 : p0(A \ B) > p0(A)p0(B)g, which captures the constraint that the events
8The representation I = IB is unique, because for any Bayesian input I, there exists a unique
event B such that I = IB .
9For any Je§rey input I, the corresponding family ("B)B2B is essentially uniquely determined, in
the sense that the subpartition fB 2 B : "B 6= 0g and the corresponding subfamily ("B)B2B:"B 6=0 are
unique. The subpartition fB 2 B : "B = 0g is sometimes non-unique. Uniqueness can be achieved
by imposing the convention that jfB 2 B : "B = 0gj * 1.
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A and B are positively correlated, or I = fp0 : p0(A) 1 9=10g, which captures the
constraint that A is highly probable. In general, the smaller the set I, the stronger
(more constraining) the input. The strongest consistent inputs are the singleton sets
I = fp0g, which require adopting the new belief state p0 regardless of the initial belief
state. The weakest input is the set I = P, which allows the agent to retain his old
belief state.
We are now able to deÖne Bayesís and Je§reyís rules in this framework. (Of
course, the framework equally permits the deÖnition of other belief-revision rules.)
DeÖnition 2
/ Let DBayes be the set of all pairs (p; I) 2 P & I such that I = IB is a Bayesian
input compatible with p (which means p(B) 6= 0). Bayesís rule is the revision
rule on DBayes which maps each (p; IB) 2 DBayes to p0 2 P, where
p0(A) = p(AjB) for all events A ! ": (1)
/ Let DJe§rey be the set of all pairs (p; I) 2 P & I such that I = I(&B)B2B is a
Je§rey input compatible with p (which means %B = 0 whenever p(B) = 0).
Je§reyís rule is the revision rule on DJe§rey which maps each (p; I(&B)B2B) 2
DJe§rey to p0 2 P, where
p0(A) =
X
B2B
p(AjB)%B for all events A ! ": (2)
The domains DBayes and DJe§rey are the maximal domains for which formulas
(1) and (2) are well-deÖned.10 Je§reyís rule extends Bayesís, i.e., it coincides with
Bayesís rule on the subdomain DBayes (! DJe§rey).
3 An axiomatic characterization
We now introduce two plausible axioms that a belief-revision rule may be expected to
satisfy and show that they imply that the agent must revise his beliefs in accordance
with Bayesís rule in response to any Bayesian input and in accordance with Je§reyís
rule in response to any Je§rey input. As already noted, the same axioms can also
be used to characterize other belief-revision rules, but we relegate these extensions to
follow-up work (see footnote 4). All proofs are given in the Appendix.
3.1 Two axioms
Let D ! P & I be the domain of the belief-revision rule. For each beliefñinput pair
(p; I) 2 D, we write pI 2 P to denote the revised belief state. Our Örst axiom says
that the revised belief state should be responsive to the learnt input.
Responsiveness: pI 2 I for all beliefñinput pairs (p; I) 2 D.
10The deÖnition of each revision rule and its domain relies on the fact that each Bayesian input I
is uniquely representable as I = IB and that each Je§rey input is ëalmostí uniquely representable as
I = I("B)B2B , where any residual non-uniqueness makes no di§erence to the revised belief state or
the criterion for including (p; I) in the domain. For details, see Lemmas 1 and 3 in the Appendix.
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Responsiveness guarantees that the agentís revised belief state respects the constraint
given by the input. For example, in response to a Bayesian input, the agent assigns
probability one to the learnt event.
The second axiom expresses a natural conservativeness requirement: those ëpartsí
of the agentís belief state on which the learnt input is ësilentí should not change in
response to it. In short, the learnt input should have no e§ect where it has nothing to
say. To deÖne that axiom formally, we must answer two questions: what do we mean
by ëparts of a belief stateí, and when is a given input ësilentí on them? To answer
these questions, note that, intuitively:
/ a Bayesian input is not silent on the probability of the learnt event B, but is
silent on all conditional probabilities, given B; and
/ a Je§rey input is not silent on the probabilities of the events in the relevant
partition B, but is silent on all conditional probabilities, given these events.
So, the ëpartsí of the agentís belief state on which Bayesian inputs and Je§rey
inputs are ësilentí are conditional probabilities of some events, given others. The
relevant conditional probabilities are preserved by Bayesís and Je§reyís rules, so that
these rules are intuitively conservative.
In the next subsection, we deÖne formally what it means for a learnt input to be
ësilentí on the probability of one event, given another. Once we have this deÖnition,
we can formulate our conservativeness axiom as follows.
Conservativeness (axiom scheme): For all beliefñinput pairs (p; I) 2 D, if I is
ësilentí on the probability of a (relevant) event A given another B, this conditional
probability is preserved, i.e., pI(AjB) = p(AjB) (if pI(B); p(B) 6= 0).
3.2 When is a learnt input silent on the probability of one event,
given another?
Our aim is to deÖne when a learnt input I 2 I is ësilentí on the probability of one
event A, given another event B (where possibly B = "). Our analysis is fully general,
i.e., not restricted to any particular class of inputs, such as Bayesian inputs or Je§rey
inputs. We Örst note that we need to deÖne silence only for the case in which
? ( A ( B ! Supp(I);
where Supp(I) is the support of I, deÖned as f! 2 " : p0(!) 6= 0 for some p0 2 Ig.11
There are two plausible notions of ësilenceí, which lead to two di§erent variants
of our conservativeness axiom. We begin with the weaker notion. A learnt input is
weakly silent on the probability of A given B if it permits this conditional probability
to take any value. Formally:
DeÖnition 3 Input I 2 I is weakly silent on the probability of A given B (for
? ( A ( B ! Supp(I)) if, for every value / in [0; 1], I contains some belief state p0
(with p0(B) 6= 0) such that p0(AjB) = /.
11Here, and elsewhere, we write p0(!) as an abbreviation for p0(f!g) when we refer to the probability
of a singleton event f!g.
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For instance, the learnt input I = fp0 : p0(B) = 1=2g is weakly silent on the
probability of A given B. So is the input I = fp0 : p0(A) 2 1=2g. This weak notion
of silence gives rise to the following strong conservativeness axiom:
Strong Conservativeness: For all beliefñinput pairs (p; I) 2 D, if I is weakly silent
on the probability of an event A given another B (where ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I)),
this conditional probability is preserved, i.e., pI(AjB) = p(AjB) (if pI(B); p(B) 6= 0).
Although this axiom may seem plausible, it leads to an impossibility result.
Proposition 1 If #" 1 3, no belief-revision rule on any domain D 3 DJe§rey is
responsive and strongly conservative.
Note that, on the small domain DBayes , there is no such impossibility, because
Bayesís rule is responsive as well as strongly conservative. On that domain, the
present strong conservativeness axiom is equivalent to our later, weaker one. The im-
possibility occurs on domains on which the two conservativeness axioms come apart.
We weaken strong conservativeness by strengthening the notion of silence. The key
insight is that even if a learnt input I is weakly silent on the probability of A given B,
it may still implicitly constrain the relationship between this conditional probability
and others. Suppose, for instance, that " = f0; 1g2, where the Örst component of a
world (g; j) 2 " represents whether Richard has gone out (g=1) or not (g=0), and the
second whether Richard is wearing a jacket (j=1) or not (j=0). Consider the event
that Richard has gone out, G = f(g; j) : g = 1g, and the event that he is wearing
a jacket, J = f(g; j) : j = 1g. Some inputs are weakly silent on the probability of
J (given ") and yet require this probability to be related in certain ways to other
probability assignments, especially those conditional on J . Consider, for instance,
the Je§rey input which says that G is 90% probable, formally I = fp0 : p0(G) = 0:9g.
It is compatible with any probability of J and is thus weakly silent on the probability
of J , given ". But it requires this probability to be related in certain ways to the
probability of G, given J . If this conditional probability is 1 (which is compatible
with I), then the probability of J can no longer exceed 0.9. If it did, the probability
of G would exceed 0.9, which would contradict the learnt input I. In short, although
I does not directly constrain the agentís subjective probability for J , it constrains it
indirectly, i.e., after other parts of the belief state have been Öxed.
A learnt input is strongly silent on the probability of A given B if it permits this
conditional probability to take any value even after other parts of the agentís belief
state have been Öxed. Let us Örst explain this idea informally. What exactly are
the ëother parts of the agentís belief stateí? They are those probability assignments
that are ëorthogonalí to the probability of A given B. In other words, they are all
the beliefs of which the belief state p0 consists, over and above the probability of A
given B. More precisely, assuming again that A is included in B, they are given by
the quadruple consisting of the unconditional probability p0(B) and the conditional
probabilities p0(4jA), p0(4jBnA), and p0(4jB).12 This quadruple and the conditional
12This informal discussion assumes that p0(A); p0(BnC); p0(B) 6= 0.
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probability p0(AjB) jointly determine the belief state p0, because
p0 = p0(4jA) p0(A)| {z }
p0(AjB)p0(B)
+p0(4jBnA) p0(BnA)| {z }
p0(B)&p0(AjB)p0(B)
+p0(4jB) p0(B):| {z }
1&p0(B)
If an input I is strongly silent on the conditional probability of A given B, then this
probability can be chosen freely even after the other parts of the agentís belief state
have been Öxed in accordance with I (which requires them to match those of some
belief state p' in I). This idea is illustrated in Figure 1, where a learnt input I is
probability
of A given B
0 1
other parts of
the belief state
(a) no silence
I
0 1
(b) weak silence
I
probability
of A given B
0 1
(c) strong silence
I
probability
of A given Bα
p*
p’
α α
p*p’
other parts of
the belief state
other parts of
the belief state
Figure 1: An inputís weak or strong silence on some conditional probability
represented in the space whose horizontal coordinate represents the probability of
A given B and whose vertical) coordinate represents the other parts of the agentís
belief state (collapsed into a single dimension for illustration). In part (a), input I
(represented by the circular region) is not silent at all on the probability of A given B,
since many values of this probability, such as /, are ruled out by I. In part (b), input
I (represented by the ëovalí region) is weakly but not strongly silent on the probability
of A given B. This is because I is consistent with any value of that probability, but
to combine it with a particular value, such as /, other parts of the belief state can no
longer be freely chosen. In part (c), input I (represented by the rectangular region)
is strongly silent on the probability of A given B. It is consistent with any value of
that probability, even after other parts of the belief state have been Öxed.
To deÖne strong silence formally, we say that two belief states p0 and p' coin-
cide outside the probability of A given B if the other parts of these belief states
coincide, i.e., if p0(B) = p'(B) and p0(4jC) = p'(4jC) for all C 2 fA;BnA;Bg such
that p0(C); p'(C) 6= 0. Clearly, two belief states that coincide both (i) outside the
probability of A given B and (ii) on the probability of A given B are identical.
DeÖnition 4 Input I 2 I is strongly silent on the probability of A given B
(for ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I)) if, for all / 2 [0; 1] and all p' 2 I, the set I contains
some belief state p0 (with p0(B) 6= 0) which
(a) coincides with / on the probability of A given B, i.e., p0(AjB) = /,
(b) coincides with p' outside the probability of A given B (if p'(A); p'(BnA) 6= 0).
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In this deÖnition, there is only one belief state p0 satisfying (a) and (b), given by
p0 := p'(4jA)/p'(B) + p'(4jBnA)(15 /)p'(B) + p'(4 \B); (3)
so that the requirement that there exists some p0 in I satisfying (a) and (b) reduces
to the requirement that I contains the belief state (3).13
For example, the inputs I = fp0 : p0 is uniform on Bg and I = fp0 : p0(B) 1 1=2g
are strongly silent on the probability of A given B, since this conditional probability
can take any value, independently of other parts of the agentís belief state (e.g.,
independently of the probability of B). This strengthened notion of silence leads to
a weaker conservativeness axiom, which we call just ëconservativenessí.
Conservativeness: For all beliefñinput pairs (p; I) 2 D, if I is strongly silent on
the probability of an event A given another B (for ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I)), this
conditional probability is preserved, i.e., pI(AjB) = p(AjB) (if pI(B); p(B) 6= 0).
3.3 An alternative perspective on weak and strong silence
Before stating our characterization theorem, we note that there is an alternative and
equivalent way of deÖning weak and strong silence, which gives a di§erent perspective
on these notions. Informally, weak silence can be taken to mean that the learnt input
implies nothing for the probability of A given B. Strong silence can be taken to mean
that all its implications are ëoutsideí the probability of A given B (i.e., the input
constrains only parts of the agentís belief state that are orthogonal to the probability
of A given B). To make this more precise, we Örst deÖne the ëimplicationí of a learnt
probability
of A given B
0 1
BAI |
BAI |
I
other parts of
the belief state
Figure 2: The implications IAjB and IAjB derived from input I
input I for the probability of A given B and for other parts of the agentís belief state.
Again, we assume that ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I).
/ The implication of I for the probability of A given B is the input,
denoted IAjB, which says everything that I says about the probability of A
given B, and nothing else (see Figure 2). So, IAjB contains all belief states p0
13To be precise, this is true whenever p%(A); p%(BnA) 6= 0.
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which are compatible with I on the probability of A given B. Formally, IAjB is
the set of all p0 in P such that p0(AjB) = p'(AjB) for some p' in I (modulo a
non-triviality constraint).14
/ The implication of I outside the probability of A given B is the input,
denoted I
AjB, which says everything that I says outside the probability of A
given B, and nothing else (see Figure 2). So, I
AjB contains all belief states which
are compatible with I outside the probability of A given B. Formally, I
AjB is
the set of all p0 in P which coincide with some p' in I outside the probability
of A given B (modulo a non-triviality constraint).15
Clearly, I ! IAjB and I ! IAjB. The inputs IAjB and IAjB capture two orthogonal
components (ësub-inputsí) of the full input I. Each component encodes part of the
information conveyed by I. Weak and strong silence can now be characterized (and
thereby alternatively deÖned) as follows.
Proposition 2 For all inputs I 2 I and events A, B (where ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I)),
(a) I is weakly silent on the probability of A given B if and only if IAjB = P (i.e.,
I implies nothing for the probability of A given B),
(b) I is strongly silent on the probability of A given B if and only if I
AjB = I (i.e.,
I implies only something outside the probability of A given B).
We can illustrate this proposition by combining Figures 1 and 2. According to part
(a), weak silence means that the sub-input IAjB, which pertains to the probability of
A given B, is vacuous. Graphically, it covers the entire area in the plot. According
to part (b), strong silence means that the input I conveys no information beyond
the sub-input I
AjB, which pertains to those parts of the agentís belief state that
are orthogonal to the probability of A given B. Graphically, the input I covers a
rectangular area ranging from the far left to the far right.
3.4 The theorem
We have seen that the strong version of our conservativeness axiom, deÖned in terms
of weak silence, leads to an impossibility result. By contrast, its weaker counterpart,
deÖned in terms of strong silence, yields a characterization of Bayesís and Je§reyís
rules.
Theorem 1 Bayesís and Je§reyís rules are the only responsive and conservative
belief-revision rules on the domains DBayes and DJe§rey, respectively.
Corollary 1 Every responsive and conservative belief-revision rule on some domain
D ! P & I coincides with Bayesís rule on D \ DBayes and with Je§reyís rule on
D \DJe§rey.
14 In full precision, IAjB is the set of all p
0 in P such that if p0(B) 6= 0 then p0(AjB) = p%(AjB) for
some p% in I satisfying p%(B) 6= 0.
15 In full precision, IAjB is the set of all p
0 in P such that if there is a belief state p% in I satisfying
[p%(C) 6= 0 for all C 2 fA;BnAg such that p0(C) 6= 0], then p0 coincides with some such p% outside
the probability of A given B.
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It is easier to prove that if a belief-revision rule on one of these domains is
responsive and conservative, then it must be Bayesís or Je§reyís rule, than to prove the
converse implication, namely that each of these rules is responsive and conservative
on its domain. To illustrate the easier implication, note, for instance, that if a beliefñ
input pair (p; I) belongs to DBayes, such as I = fp0 : p0(B) = 1g, then the new belief
state pI equals pI(4jB) (since pI(B) = 1, by responsiveness), which equals p(4jB) (by
conservativeness, as I is strongly silent on probabilities given B). The reason why the
converse implication is harder to prove is that one must take care to identify all the
conditional probabilities on which a given input is strongly silent; there are more such
conditional probabilities than one might expect. Once we have identiÖed all those
conditional probabilities, however, we can verify that the corresponding belief-revision
rule does indeed preserve all of them, as required by conservativeness.
4 A decision-theoretic application
To show that there is room for non-Bayesian belief-revision rules in economic theory,
we now sketch an illustrative application of Je§rey revision to decision and game
theory. Standard dynamic decision and game theory is inherently Bayesian. As is
widely recognized, this sometimes entails unrealistic assumptions of forward-looking
rationality, which limit the ability to model real-life learning, reasoning, and beha-
viour. We give an example which illustrates some of these di¢culties and shows how
a non-Bayesian model can avoid them. The example suggests a new class of dy-
namic decision problems or games, those ëwith surprisesí or ëwith unforeseen learning
inputsí.
Ann, an employer, must decide whether to hire Bob, a job candidate. There is
no time for a job interview, since a quick decision is needed. Ann is uncertain about
whether Bob is competent or not; both possibilities have prior probability 12 . It would
help Ann to know whether Bob has previous work experience, since this is positively
correlated with competence, but gathering this information takes time. Bobís type is
thus a pair (/; 5) whose Örst component indicates whether he is competent (/ = c) or
not (/ = c) and whose second component indicates whether he has work experience
(5 = e) or not (5 = e). To apply a belief-revision model, let the set of worlds be
the set of possible types of Bob, i.e., " = fc; cg & fe; eg. Annís initial beliefs about
Bobís type are given by the belief state p 2 P in which p(c; e) = p(c; e) = 0:4 and
p(c; e) = p(c; e) = 0:1. Note the positive correlation between competence and work
experience.
Ann initially seems to face the dynamic decision problem shown in Figure 3:
/ First, a chance move determines Bobís type in " according to the probability
measure p.
/ Next, Ann, uninformed of the chance move, can hire Bob (h) or reject him (h)
or gather information about whether he has previous work experience (g).
/ Finally, if Ann chooses g, she faces a subsequent choice between hiring Bob (h)
or rejecting him (h), but now she has information about 5, i.e., about whether
he has work experience.
12
Figure 3: Annís decision problem in its initial form
Ann is an expected-utility maximizer, and her utility function is as follows: hiring
Bob, who is of type (/; 5), contributes an amount v(/) to her utility, where v(/) = 5
if / = c and v(/) = 55 if / = c; and gathering information about 5 reduces her
utility by 1. Not hiring Bob yields a utility of 0. Ann has only one rational strategy:
Örst she gathers information (g), and then she hires Bob if and only if she learns that
Bob has work experience (5 = e). To see why, note the following. Immediately hiring
Bob yields an expected utility of v(c)p(c) + v(c)p(c) = 512 + (55)12 = 0. Immediately
rejecting Bob also yields an expected utility of 0. Gathering information leads Ann
to a Bayesian belief revision:
/ If she learns that he has work experience, she raises her probability that he is
competent to p(cje) = p(c;e)p(e) = 0:40:5 = 45 . So, she hires Bob, since this yields an
expected utility of (v(c) 5 1)p(cje) + (v(c) 5 1)p(cje) = 445 + (56)15 = 2, while
rejecting Bob would have yielded an expected utility of 51.
/ If she learns that Bob has no work experience, she lowers her probability that
he is competent to p(cje) = p(c;e)p(e) = 0:10:5 = 15 . So, she rejects him as this yields
an expected utility of 51, whereas hiring him would have yielded an expected
utility of (v(c)5 1)p(cje) + (v(c)5 1)p(cje) = 415 + (56)45 = 54.
So ex ante the expected utility of gathering information is the average 2p(e) +
(51)p(e) = 212 + (51)12 = 12 , which exceeds the zero expected utility of the two
other choices.
So far, everything is classical. Now suppose Ann follows her rational strategy.
She writes to Bob to ask whether he has work experience. At this point, however,
something surprising happens. Bobís answer reveals right from the beginning that
his written English is poor. Ann notices this even before Öguring out what Bob
says about his work experience. In response to this unforeseen learnt input, Ann
lowers her probability that Bob is competent from 12 to
1
8 . It is natural to model
this as an instance of Je§rey revision. Formally, Ann learns the Je§rey input I =
fp0 2 P : p0(c) = 18g, and by Je§reyís rule her revised belief state pI is given by
pI(c; e) =
1
10 , pI(c; e) =
1
40 , pI(c; e) =
7
40 , and pI(c; e) =
7
10 . As she reads the
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Figure 4: Two ways of reÖning Annís decision problem
rest of Bobís letter, Ann eventually learns that he has previous work experience,
which prompts a Bayesian belief revision, so that her Önal belief state is pI(4je) (or
equivalently, (pI)I0 where I 0 is the Bayesian input I 0 = fp0 2 P : p0(e) = 1g). Since
Annís posterior probability for Bobís competence is only pI(cje) = pI(c;e)pI(c;e)+pI(c;e) =
4
11 ,
she decides not to hire him, despite his work experience.
Can classical decision theory explain this? Of course, the dynamic decision prob-
lem shown in Figure 3 is no longer adequate, as it wrongly predicts that Ann hires
Bob after learning that he has work experience. The natural response, from a clas-
sical perspective, would be to reÖne the decision problem as shown in Figure 4(a).
After Annís information-gathering move g an additional chance move is introduced,
which determines whether Bobís written English is normal (w) or poor (w), where
the probability of w, denoted t-;., is larger if Bob is competent than if he is not, i.e.,
tc;. > tc;. . After observing this chance move, Ann makes her hiring decision.
Although this reÖned classical model predicts that Ann turns down Bob after
receiving his poorly written letter, it is inadequate in many ways. It ignores the fact
that Ann is initially unaware of ñ or does not consider ñ the possibility that Bobís
written English is poor (suppose, for instance, that based on her initial information,
she had no reason to doubt, or even to think about, Bobís literacy). It treats the
event of a poorly written letter from Bob as a foreseen rather than an unforeseen
contingency. As a result, Annís reasoning at each of her decision nodes is modelled
in an inadequate manner:
(i) In her Örst decision (between h; h, and g), Ann is falsely taken to foresee the
possibilities of learning w or learning w, i.e., to reason along the tree displayed
in Figure 4(a) rather than that in Figure 3. This artiÖcially complicates her
expected-utility maximization exercise, for instance by assuming awareness of
the four parameters t-;., for all values of / and 5.
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(ii) In her second decision, in case Bobís written English is normal, Ann is taken
to have learnt not just the parameter 5, but also the chance move w (normal
written English), so that her posterior probability for Bobís competence is now
p(cj5;w) rather than p(cj5). The additional conditionalization on w misrep-
resents Annís beliefs, since the absence of linguistic errors in Bobís letter goes
unnoticed: it is not an unforeseen event (she had taken Bobís normal literacy
for granted). In fact, Ann continues to conceptualize her decision problem as
the one shown in Figure 3 rather than the one in 4(a). The additional belief
revision (upon learning w) departs from, and complicates, Annís true reasoning.
(iii) In her second decision, in case Bobís written English is poor, Annís reason-
ing is again misrepresented. Although it is true that the unforeseen news that
Bobís written English is poor implies that Ann cannot uphold her original con-
ceptualization of the decision problem (Figure 3), it does not follow that Ann
re-conceptualizes her decision problem in line with Figure 4(a). Our informal
description of Annís reasoning takes her to perform a Je§rey revision of her be-
liefs over " = fc; cg&fe; eg, whereas Figure 4(a) takes her to perform a Bayesian
revision of beliefs over the reÖned set of worlds "0 = fc; cg & fe; eg & fw;wg.
Arguably, the Bayesian model of Annís behaviour is not only psychologically inad-
equate, but its predictive adequacy is also far from clear. Whether the model correctly
predicts Annís behaviour at the various decision nodes depends on the exact calib-
ration of the parameters t-;., for all values of / and 5. Their most plausible (e.g.,
ëobjectiveí) values might not imply Annís true decision behaviour, since that beha-
viour has a rather di§erent psychological origin, which does not involve the parameters
t-;. at all.
We propose to model Annís decision problem non-classically as a decision prob-
lem with unforeseen inputs or surprises. As illustrated in Figure 4(b), instead of
introducing a chance move (selecting w or w), we introduce a surprise move, which
determines whether or not Ann receives a particular unforeseen input (here, the Jef-
frey input I = fp0 2 " : p0(c) = 18g). Then the problems in (i), (ii), and (iii) no longer
arise:
/ Problem (i) is avoided because Ann does not foresee or conceptualize the sur-
prise move before its occurrence, so that she initially still reasons along the
simple decision tree of Figure 3.
/ Problem (ii) is avoided because in her second decision, without receiving the
unforeseen input (the right branch at the surprise node), Ann only learns 5
and hence reasons like in her second decision in the simple decision problem of
Figure 3.
/ Problem (iii) is avoided because in her second decision, after receiving the un-
foreseen input (the left branch at the surprise node), Ann revises her beliefs in
response to the Je§rey input I.
In follow-up work, we formally deÖne decision problems (or more generally games)
with unforeseen inputs and introduce a corresponding equilibrium notion.16 The
16Annís equilibrium strategy in her decision problem with unforeseen inputs has the intended form:
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details are beyond the scope of the present paper. Our aim in this section has simply
been to illustrate that there is useful room for non-Bayesian belief-revision rules in a
decision-theoretic model.
5 Concluding remarks
We have developed a uniÖed framework for the study of belief revision and shown
that Bayesís and Je§reyís rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms:
responsiveness to the learnt input and conservativeness. The only di§erence between
those rules lies in the domains of learnt inputs to which they apply.
Beyond o§ering a novel formal framework, the programmatic aim of this paper
has been to put non-Bayesian belief revision onto the map for economic theorists. No
doubt, skeptics will still wonder, ëwhy bother about non-Bayesian belief revisioní. By
suitably reÖning the set " of possible worlds, so the objection goes, we can always
remodel Je§rey inputs (as well as other non-Bayesian inputs) in a Bayesian manner.
However, as we have noted in our discussions of Suzumuraís story and ëAnn the
employerí, such Bayesian remodelling comes at a cost:
Over-ascription of opinionation: A key drawback of the Bayesian remodelling
is that we must assume that the agent is able to assign prior probabilities to many
complex events. In Suzumuraís story, the agent must assign prior probabilities to the
various possible auditory signals that he might receive over the phone. Similarly, Ann
the employer must assign prior probabilities to the various possible Je§rey inputs she
might receive. These may include not only learning that Bobís written English is poor,
but also that he is a poetic writer, that he comes across as communicatively awkward
in a way that she had not anticipated, and so on. To accommodate the possibility of
belief changes in response to such inputs, we would have to ascribe to the agent beliefs
over an ever more reÖned algebra of events, whose size grows exponentially with the
number of belief changes to be modelled. This is not very plausible, since typical
real-world agents either have no beliefs about such events or have only imprecise
ones. Even on a pure ëas-ifí interpretation of the Bayesian model, taking an agent to
have highly sophisticated beliefs is dubious, given the complexity of their behavioural
implications, which may be hard to test empirically. By contrast, once we restrict the
complexity of the event-algebra, we may have to invoke non-Bayesian belief revision
to capture the agentís belief dynamics adequately.
Over-ascription of awareness: The literature on unawareness suggests that a belief
in an event (the assignment of a subjective probability to it) presupposes awareness of
this event, where awareness is understood, not as knowledge of the eventís occurrence
or non-occurrence, but as conceptualization, mental representation, imagination, or
consideration of its possibility (e.g., Dekel et al. 1998; Heifetz et al. 2006; Modica
and Rustichini 1999). But as we have noted, it is far from clear whether, prior to
the telephone conversation with Gorman, Suzumura even considered the possibility of
receiving incomprehensible auditory signals, or whether Ann the employer would have
she Örst gathers information (g), and then hires Bob if and only if she does not receive the unforeseen
input I (Bobís poor written English) and learns that he has work experience (+ = e).
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considered the possibility that Bobís written English was so poor. In these examples,
the agents plausibly lacked not only knowledge but also awareness of the ësurprise
eventsí. Arguably, many real-life belief changes involve the observation or experience
of something that was previously not just unknown, but even beyond awareness or
imagination.
In sum, an economic modeller often faces a choice between
(i) ascribing to an agent Bayesian revision of beliefs over a very complex, Öne-
grained algebra of events and
(ii) ascribing non-Bayesian revision of beliefs over a simpler, more coarse-grained
algebra of events.
Perhaps because of the elegance of Bayesís rule, many economists tend to assume that
the Örst of these routes is more parsimonious than the second. But this overlooks
the loss of parsimony at the level of the event-algebra. If all non-Bayesian belief-
revision rules were ad hoc or otherwise unsatisfactory, the choice of route (i) might
be understandable. But as we have shown, there are perfectly well-behaved non-
Bayesian alternatives. This should make option (ii) at least a contender worth taking
seriously.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Well-deÖnedness of each revision rule
Our two belief-revision rules are well-deÖned because the mathematical object used
in the deÖnition of the new belief state and the ruleís domain ñ i.e., the learnt event
B or the learnt family of probabilities (%B) ñ is uniquely determined by the relevant
input I (in the case of Bayesís rule) or su¢ciently determined (in the case of Je§reyís
rule) so that the deÖnition does not depend on non-unique features. The following
two lemmas, which the reader can easily verify, make this precise:
Lemma 1 Every Bayesian input is generated by exactly one event B ! ".
Lemma 2 For every Je§rey input I,
(a) all families (%B)B2B generating I have the same subfamily (%B)B2B:&B 6=0 (es-
pecially, the same set fB 2 B : %B 6= 0g);
(b) in particular, for every (initial) belief state p 2 P, the (revised) belief state (2)
is either (i) deÖned and identical for all families (%B)B2B generating I, or (ii)
undeÖned for all these families.17
A.2 Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that #" 1 3. Suppose, for a contradiction, that
there exists a responsive and conservative revision rule on a domain D 3 DJe§rey.
Since #" 1 3, we can Önd events A;B ! " such that A \ B;BnA;AnB 6= ?.
Consider an initial belief state p such that p(A \ B) = 1=4 and p(AnB) = 3=4, and
deÖne the Je§rey input I := fp0 : p0(B) = 1=2g. Note that (p; I) 2 D. What is the
new belief state pI?
First, note that I is weakly silent on the probability of A \ B given B. So, by
strong conservativeness, we have pI(A \ BjB) = p(A \ BjB) (using the fact that
p(B) 6= 0 and that pI(B) 6= 0 by responsiveness), i.e., (*) pI(AjB) = 1.
Similarly, (**) pI(AjB) = 1. (This is trivial if A \ B = B, and can otherwise be
shown like (*), using the fact that I is weakly silent on the probability of A\B given
B.) By (*) and (**), pI(A) = 1.
17Footnote 1 speciÖes when (2) is deÖned.
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Further, I is weakly silent on the probability of A \ B given A, so that we
have pI(A \ BjA) = p(A \ BjA), by strong conservativeness (using the fact that
pI(A); p(A) 6= 0). Since pI(A) = 1 and given the deÖnition of p, it follows that
pI(B) = 1=4. But, by responsiveness, we have pI(B) = 1=2, a contradiction. !
A.3 Proposition 2
We begin by o§ering a convenient reformulation of strong silence; we leave the proof
to the reader.
Lemma 3 For all inputs I and all events ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I), I is strongly silent
on the probability of A given B if and only if
/ I contains a belief state p' with p'(A); p'(BnA) 6= 0, and
/ for every such p' 2 I and every / 2 [0; 1], I contains the belief state p0 which
coincides with / on the probability of A given B and with p' outside that con-
ditional probability, formally
p0 2 I where p0 = p'(4jA)/p'(B) + p'(4jBnA)(15 /)p'(B) + p'(4 \B):
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider I ! P and ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I).
(a) First suppose IAjB = P. Consider any / 2 [0; 1]. As ? ( A ( B, there
exists a belief state p0 such that p0(B) 6= 0 and p0(AjB) = /. As IAjB = P, we have
p0 2 IAjB, so that I contains a p' (with p'(B) 6= 0) such that p'(AjB) = p0(AjB), i.e.,
such that p'(AjB) = /, as required for weak silence.
Now assume that I is weakly silent on the probability of A given B. Trivially,
IAjB ! P. We show that P ! IAjB. Let p0 2 P. If p0(B) = 0, then clearly p0 2 IAjB.
Otherwise, by weak silence, applied to / := p0(AjB), I contains a p' such that
p'(B) 6= 0 and p'(AjB) = p0(AjB), so that p0 2 IAjB.
(b) First, in the trivial case in which I contains no p0 such that p0(A); p0(BnA) 6= 0,
the equivalence holds because strong silence is violated (see Lemma 3) and moreover
I
AjB 6= I because IAjB but not I contains a belief state p0 such that p0(A); p0(BnA) 6= 0.
Now consider the less trivial case in which I contains a ~p such that ~p(A); ~p(BnA) 6= 0.
First suppose I
AjB = I. To show strong silence, consider any / 2 [0; 1] and any
p' 2 I with p'(A); p'(BnA) 6= 0. By Lemma 3, it su¢ces to show that the belief
state p0 which coincides with p' outside the probability of A given B and satisÖes
p0(AjB) = / belongs to I. Clearly, p0 belongs to I
AjB. Hence, as I = IAjB, p
0 belongs
to I.
Conversely, assume that I is strongly silent on the probability of A given B.
Trivially, I ! I
AjB. To show the converse inclusion, suppose that p
0 2 I
AjB. Then
there exists p' 2 I such that p0 and p' coincide outside the probability of A given B
and such that p'(C) 6= 0 for all C 2 fA;BnAg with p0(C) 6= 0.
We distinguish two cases. First suppose p'(A); p'(BnA) 6= 0. Then p0(B) =
p'(B) 6= 0. By Iís strong silence on the probability of A given B, I contains a belief
state ~p (with ~p(B) 6= 0) which satisÖes ~p(AjB) = p0(AjB) and coincides with p'
outside the probability of A given B. Note that, since p'(A); p'(BnA) 6= 0, there can
be only one belief state that coincides with p' outside the probability of A given B
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and such that the probability of A given B takes a given value. Therefore, p0 = ~p,
and so p0 2 I, as required.
Next consider the special case in which p'(C) = 0 for at least one C 2 fA;BnAg.
As p'(C) = 0) p0(C) = 0 for each C 2 fA;BnAg and as p0(A)+ p0(BnA) = p0(B) =
p'(B) = p'(A) + p'(BnA), it follows that p0(C) = p'(C) for each C 2 fA;BnA;Bg.
This and the fact that p0(4jC) = p'(4jC) for all C 2 fA;BnA;Bg for which p0(C)
(= p'(C)) is non-zero imply that p0 = p'. So again p0 2 I. !
A.4 The main theorem
As a key step towards proving our main theorem, we now answer the following ques-
tion: on which conditional probabilities are the learnt inputs under Bayesís and Jef-
freyís rules strongly silent?
Lemma 4 Any Bayesian input I (of learning that some event B0 has occurred) is
strongly silent on any conditional probability of A given B such that ? ( A ( B ! B0.
Lemma 5 For all Je§rey inputs I (of learning a new probability distribution on a
partition B) and all events ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I), I is strongly silent on the
conditional probability of A given B if and only if B ! B0 for some B0 2 B.
Since Lemma 4 is a special case of Lemma 5, we turn directly to the proof of the
latter.
Proof. Let I, B, A, and B be as speciÖed, and let (%B)B2B be the learnt probability
distribution on B. First, if B ! B0 for some B0 2 B, then I is strongly silent on the
probability of A given B, as one can easily check, using Lemma 3. Conversely, suppose
that B 6! B0 for all B0 2 B. For each D ! ", we write BD := fB0 2 B : B0 \D 6= ?g.
Note that BB = BA [ BBnA, where #BA 1 1 (as A 6= ?), #BBnA 1 1 (as BnA 6= ?),
and #BB 1 2 (as otherwise B would be included in a B0 ! B). It follows that there
are B0 2 BA and B00 2 BBnA with B0 6= B00. Note that I contains a p' such that
p'(B0 \ A) = %B0 and p'(B00 \ (BnA)) = %B00 . Since each of B0 and B00 has a non-
empty intersection with B, and hence with Supp(I) (3 B), we have %B0 ; %B00 6= 0.
Now p'(B00 \A) = p'(B00 \B) = 0, since
p'((B00 \A) [ (B00 \B)) = p'(B00)5 p'(B00 \ (BnA)) = %B00 5 %B00 = 0.
By Lemma 3, if I were strongly silent on the probability of A given B, I would
also contain the belief state p0 which coincides with p' outside the probability of
A given B and satisÖes p0(AjB) = 1; i.e., I would contain the belief state p0 :=
p'(4jA)p'(B) + p'(4 \B). But this is not the case because
p0(B00) = p'(B00jA)p'(B) + p'(B00 \B) = 0 6= %B00 ,
where the second equality uses the fact that p'(B00 \A) = p'(B00 \B) = 0, which we
have shown. Hence, I is not strongly silent on the probability of A given B. !
We can now complete the proof of our characterization theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 1. It su¢ces to consider Je§reyís rule, since Bayesís rule is
extended by Je§reyís. We Örst prove one direction of implication, and then prove the
other direction.
Part 1 : We consider a responsive and conservative revision rule on the domain
DJe§rey and show that the rule is indeed Je§reyís rule. Suppose (p; I) 2 DJe§rey, say
I = fp0 : p(B) = %B 8B 2 Bg. Then pI is given by Je§reyís rule, because we may
expand pI as
pI =
X
B2B:pI(B) 6=0
pI(4jB)pI(B); (4)
where pI(B) reduces to %B by responsiveness, and pI(4jB) reduces to p(4jB) by con-
servativeness. (Note that, by Lemma 5, I is strongly silent on the probability, given
B, of any event strictly between ? and B.)
Part 2 : Conversely, we now show that Je§reyís rule is responsive and conservative.
Responsiveness is obvious. To establish conservativeness, consider any (p; I) in the
domain DJe§rey and any events ? ( A ( B ! Supp(I) such that I is strongly
silent on the probability of A given B and pI(B); p(B) 6= 0. We have to show that
pI(AjB) = p(AjB).
As a Je§rey input, I takes the form fp0 : p0(B) = %B 8B 2 Bg for some learnt
probability distribution (%B)B2B on some partition B. Since I is strongly silent on
the probability of A given B, we must have B ! B0 for some B0 2 B, by Lemma 5.
It follows that pI(AjB) = p(AjB), because
pI(AjB) = pI(A)
pI(B)
=
p(AjB0)%B0
p(BjB0)%B0 =
p(A)=p(B0)
p(B)=p(B0)
= p(AjB),
where the second identity holds by the deÖnition of Je§rey revision. !
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